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Abstract Constrained coherence is compared to coherence and its role in the
behavioural interpretation of coherence is discussed. The equivalence of these
two notions is proven for coherent conditional previsions, showing that the
same course of reasoning applies to several similar concepts developed in the
realm of imprecise probability theory.
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As well known, coherence is a fundamental concept in the work of Bruno
de Finetti to establish the consistency of a subjective probability assessment
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(de Finetti, 1974). He also dened coherence of previsions for bounded ran-
dom variables (or gambles, following the current terminology), denition ex-
tended formally to conditional gambles by his School, cf. Holzer (1985). Several
variants appeared later in the realm of imprecise probability theory, ranging
from coherent lower/upper probabilities and (conditional) previsions to convex
lower/upper conditional previsions (Walley, 1991, Williams, 2007, Pelessoni
and Vicig, 2005). These denitions share a common feature: they require that
the supremum of a certain gamble, usually termed gain, is non{negative, which
has a behavioural interpretation referring to some betting scheme. To exem-
plify in a suciently general case, recall the denition of coherent prevision
on an arbitrary set D of conditional gambles (Holzer, 1985).
Denition 1 (Coherence) A map P : D ! R is a coherent conditional





siIBi(Xi   P (XijBi)); B = B1 _ : : : _Bn (1)
it holds that supfGjBg  0.
Here IBi is the indicator of event Bi and IBi(Xi   P (XijBi)) is the ele-
mentary gain of an agent paying the price P (XijBi) to buy XijBi (to bet on
XijBi), with the proviso that the bet is called o and the money returned if
and only if Bi does not occur. Then Denition 1 requires that no nite linear
combination G of elementary gains is such that supfGjBg < 0. Conditioning
on B is equivalent to at least one elementary bet being not called o.
De Finetti's coherence for unconditional previsions is the special case of
Denition 1 where all gambles in D are unconditional (hence XijBi = Xij
 =
Xi, 8i, andGjB = Gj
 = G). If further they are indicators of events, we obtain
coherence for probabilities. Moreover, many coherence concepts in imprecise
probability theory can be obtained from Denition 1, typically just imposing
additional constraints to the coecients s1; : : : ; sn. For instance, requiring
that at most one of the s1; : : : ; sn may be negative corresponds to Williams'
coherence for lower conditional previsions (in the version of Pelessoni and Vicig
(2009)), or to the coherence in Walley (1991), Sec. 2.5.4(a), when all gambles
in D are unconditional.
In all such cases, an objection commonly raised by researchers approach-
ing these issues is that the gain (GjB in Denition 1) is lower unbounded (at
the varying of s1; : : : ; sn), which might cause a distortion in the agent's price
assessments (for XijBi, in Denition 1), or an unwillingness to accept what-
ever s1; : : : ; sn. Mathematically, the question might be ignored by considering
Denition 1 as axiomatical, hence not necessarily supporting any interpreta-
tion. Interestingly, there is however a mathematically simple way{out to the
question that preserves the betting interpretation, and this is constrained co-
herence. In fact, it is possible to modify the denition of coherence so that
the gain is bounded in absolute value by some arbitrarily chosen real k > 0
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(constrained coherence), and to prove the equivalence coherence { constrained
coherence. This clearly allows us to focus on the simpler concept of coherence.
Constrained coherence is not much emphasised in the literature: it is dis-
cussed for coherent (unconditional) probabilities in Crisma (2006), and hinted
in Pelessoni and Vicig (2005), Footnote 6 for (unconditional) convex lower
previsions. Here I prove the equivalence in the case of coherent conditional
previsions.
Denition 2 (Constrained coherence) A map P : D ! R is a constrained
coherent conditional prevision onD if and only if, given an arbitrary real k > 0,
8n 2 N, 8X1jB1; : : : ; XnjBn 2 D, 8s1; : : : ; sn 2 R, dening G and B as in (1),
if supfjGjBjg  k then supfGjBg  0.
Proposition 1 P is coherent if and only if it is constrained coherent on D.
Proof Coherence trivially implies constrained coherence.
For the converse implication, assume P is constrained coherent. It is then
sucient to prove that if supfjGjBjg > k, then supfGjBg  0.
In fact, dene for any such G in (1) the coecients
s0i =
k
supfjGjBjg  si; i = 1; : : : ; n




s0iIBi(Xi   P (XijBi)) =
k
supfjGjBjg G:
Then supfjG0jBjg = supf ksupfjGjBjg  jGjBjg = k, hence supfG0jBg  0 by
constrained coherence of P .
Therefore also supfGjBg = supfjGjBjgk  supfG0jBg  0:
The above result clearly applies to its special cases of coherence for uncondi-
tional previsions and (conditional or not) probabilities. By means of essentially
the same proof, it is also easy to prove a number of analogous equivalences be-
tween further coherence concepts and their constrained denitions, including
Williams' coherence and other notions developed for imprecise probabilities
and previsions. We may thus conclude that coherence{based theories gener-
ally oer a sound solution to interpretation problems arising from the possible
unboundedness of the gains.
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